I … Expand. How can states signal their alliance commitments? Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific … Expand. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? Scholars have long debated the effects of military alliances on the likelihood of war, and no clear support has emerged for the argument that alliances improve the prospects for peace through … Expand.
The cost of security. It is well recognized that military alliances can provide their members with important security benefits. However, less attention has been paid to the policy concessions states must grant others to … Expand. International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties. Why do states ever form military alliances with unreliable partners?
States sign offensive and defensive military alliances to increase their fighting capabilities in the event of war and as a signal … Expand. The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war. This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two … Expand.
To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances. Abstract Creating institutions that effectively manage interstate conflict is a priority for policy-makers.
In this article we demonstrate that military allies are well positioned to influence the … Expand. View 1 excerpt. Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining … Expand.
Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs. Alliances are not perfectly credible. Although alliances raise the probability of intervention into war, many allies do not honor their promise in wartime. A formal model of alliances as signals of … Expand. International Crises and Domestic Politics. Audience costs enable leaders to make credible commitments and to communicate their intentions to their adversaries during a crisis.
I explain audience costs by simultaneously modeling crisis … Expand. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability. Arms Versus Alliances. If a state can choose between arming itself by extracting resources from its domestic constituents or seeking allies who will pledge military resources to that state, does there exist an optimal … Expand.
Arms versus allies: trade-offs in the search for security. Nations have two methods of increasing their security: building arms and forming alliances. Both methods present different political costs that must be incurred to raise security. Building arms … Expand. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.
The author distinguishes between two types of costly signals that state leaders might employ in trying to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states, whether in the realm of … Expand. Governments are likely to be held accountable for the success or failure of their foreign policies. Because states outside an alliance think that if allies coordinate their foreign policies, then they bear a sort of costs to build this similarity, such coordination makes the alliance more credible and thus enhance its deterrent effect.
In this case, peacetime coordination makes costs and the alliance more credible. However, several questions arise. For starters, do formal military alliances always lead extensive military coordination?
However, it is a testable hypothesis, not an axiomatic empirical law. It is also possible that states do not fulfill their commitment to perform peaceful coordination.
Furthermore, are these costs imposed by coordinating foreign policies and military force really bigger than the costs of intervening in an undesirable war?
If shared interests which lie behind formal alliance vanish, then the costs of fulfilling alliance commitment may sharply increase. Even under this circumstance, formal alliance may remain intact because breaking formal agreement is costly, especially when no several conflicts occur. Therefore, assuming that the costs made by forming formal alliance are always bigger than the costs of being entrapped into a war is not compelling. Coordination of foreign policies and military force is involved with states behavior.
Therefore, even states which forge informal alignment or alliance without formal agreement can extensively coordinate their foreign policies and military force — consider U. The Void Costs of Breaking Commitment.
Specifically, his argument on audience costs deserves attention. Formulated by James Fearon, another leading IR scholar on formal theories, audience costs is one of the most compelling theories of international relations.
Its central logic is that states and leaders should pay the costs if they fail to fulfill its commitment because actors outside the government could impose political costs on leaders by punishment. Therefore, the costs of fighting a war with allies reduce as the costs of breaking commitments increase. However, one can raise a critique of this theory. Especially, leaders who choose not to intervene might be punished only if opposing parties or citizens believe that breaking commitment is likely to damage national interest; namely, its reputation or prestige, status.
However, when they judge that intervention will not serve national interest, then why we believe leaders would still be punished by domestic actors? For example, the costs of fighting a powerful aggressor seem too high, even for domestic actors outside the government. The majority of constituents may have dovish preferences; in this case, even opposing parties try to punish leaders in office by criticizing non-fulfillment of commitment, it is likely to be a void attempt. Furthermore, domestic balance of power is an important factor of creating audience costs.
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